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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
LAW OF THE SEA-SUBMERGED LANDS-A STATE MUST EXERCISE SUB-
STANTIAL, CONTINUOUS, AND RECOGNIZED AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH A BODY OF
WATER AS A HISTORIC BAY.
In April 1967 the State of Alaska offered to sell, at competitive bidding,
an oil and gas lease to a tract of approximately 2,500 acres of submerged
lands located in lower Cook Inlet' on Alaska's southwestern coast. One
month later the United States brought suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Alaska,' asserting that its rights to the resources
therein precluded Alaska's action and seeking (1) a temporary restraining
order to enjoin Alaska from issuing mineral leases' and (2) a ruling to quiet
title to the lands. The plaintiff advanced three arguments in support of its
contention,' alleging primarily that the area claimed was not "inland
water" and, therefore, had not been "granted ' 5 to the state by the Sub-
merged Lands Act of 1953 (SLA).8 The district court determined that lower
I The tract in question is more than three geographical miles, or approximately 3.45 land
miles, from the shore of the inlet.
2 United States v. Alaska, 352 F. Supp. 815. Under article III, section 2, clause 2 of the
United States Constitution, the case would have qualified for the original jurisdiction of the
United States Supreme Court. United States v. West Virginia, 295 U.S. 463, 470 (1935). No
reason was given as to why the United States chose not to bring an original action in that
Court. United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 186 n.2 (1975).
1 The motion was denied on the ground that no risk of irreparable harm existed. See
generally 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 225 (1973) [hereinafter cited as VANDERBILT].
The arguments were reported in VANDERBILT, supra note 3, at 225, as follows:
(1) the seaward limit of the area in which defendant has exclusive rights to the
natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of Cook Inlet is limited to three geo-
graphical miles seaward from the baseline from which the territorial sea is mea-
sured; (2) the United States has exclusive rights to the natural resources of the
subsoil and seabed of lower Cook Inlet since the submerged land in dispute is
neither inland waters nor a historic bay; and (3) the executive branch of the govern-
ment has denied that lower Cook Inlet is a historic bay and the determination
involved is a political decision not cognizable by the court.
The grant is more in the form of a recognition and confirmation of state ownership
coupled with a "quitclaim" of "all right, title, and interest of the United States, if any it has,
in and to all said lands, improvements, and natural resources . 43 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)
(1970) (emphasis added).
6 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1970). Section 6 (m) of the Alaska Statehood Act of July 7, 1958,
72 Stat. 339, 48 U.S.C. ch. 2, note, provides that the SLA "shall be applicable to the State
of Alaska and the said State shall have the same rights as do existing States thereunder."
Section 1311(a) of the SLA reads:
It is determined to be in the public interest that (1) title to and ownership of the
lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective States, and
the natural resources within such lands and waters, and (2) the right and power to
manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said lands and natural resources
all in accordance with applicable State law be, and they are, subject to the provi-
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Cook Inlet was a "historic bay"' and was to be considered "inland water"
within the meaning of the SLA.8 Consequently, the court ruled, "the sub-
surface resources of lower Cook Inlet are vested exclusively in the State of
Alaska,"' under the provisions of the SLA.' ° The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion," holding
that "the law applied by the district court was correct and its findings were
not clearly erroneous .... "12 The plaintiff appealed to the United States
Supreme Court and was granted certiorari "because of the importance of
the litigation and because the case presented a substantial question con-
cerning the proof necessary to establish a body of water as a historic bay." ' '3
Held, reversed and remanded. A state must exercise substantial, continu-
ous, and recognized authority to establish that a body of water is a historic
bay. United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184 (1975).
The controversy between the Federal Government and the states over
apportionment of the seabed resources of our coastal waters has created a
vexing problem for the judiciary as well as for private industry. As recent
technological developments have enabled more and varied interests to
follow the oil companies in their move away from the dry land and into
the sea, private sectors are increasingly in search of a sovereign to secure
their interests in the submerged lands." Historically, the coastal states had
been thought to be the proper sovereigns.'" This belief had been based on
several United States Supreme Court decisions, notably the 1845 case of
sions hereof, recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in and assigned to the
respective States ....
The Act defines a state's boundaries by declaring that:
The term "boundaries" includes the seaward boundaries of a State ... as they
existed at the time such State became a member of the Union ... but in no event
shall the term "boundaries" or the term "lands beneath navigable waters" be
interpreted as extending from the coast line more than three geographical miles into
the Atlantic Ocean or the Pacific Ocean ....
43 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (1970). The crucial definition, for the purposes of this case, lies in section
130(c) of the SLA, which reads: "The term 'coast line' means the line of ordinary low water
along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line
marking the seaward limit of inland waters .... " (emphasis added).
I The court relied on the definition of "inland water" arrived at in the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No.
5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective for United States Sept. 10, 1964) [hereinafter cited as
Convention].
I The definitions of the Convention were adopted by the Supreme Court for purposes of
the SLA in United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 161-67 (1965).
1 352 F. Supp. at 821.
10 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1311 (1970).
United States v. Alaska, 497 F.2d 1155 (1974).
12 Id. at 1158.
'= 422 U.S. at 187.
"4 Note, The Seaward Extension of States: A Boundary for New Jersey under the Sub-
merged Lands Act, 40 TEMp. L. Q. 66, 73 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Seaward].
11 See, e.g., Note, Tidelands-Definition of "Inland Waters" As Used in Submerged Lands
Act, 40 TUL. L. REv. 444 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Tidelands].
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Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan." The rule in Pollard's case was that the shores
of navigable waters and the soils under them were not granted to the
United States by the Constitution but were reserved to the states respec-
tively.' 7 In Smith v. Maryland" the Court further clarified that
"[whatever soil below low-water mark is the subject of exclusive pro-
priety and ownership, belongs to the State on whose maritime border, and
within whose territory it lies . . . ."", Finally, dicta in Manchester v.
Massachusetts0 had intimated that the state had the power of an indepen-
dent nation over the sea adjacent to its coast." However, Congress had
never acknowledged that state boundaries extended to the 3-mile limit.2
As the value of mineral rights in submerged lands became apparent, the
Federal Government began contesting the state's asserted ownership and
proposing legislation to expand federal control."3
Upon failure to secure congressional relief, the United States sought a
judicial declaration that the Pollard rule was not applicable to the mar-
ginal sea."4 In United States v. California5 the United States Supreme
Court ruled that "the Federal government rather than the state has para-
mount rights in and power over that [3-mile marginal] belt, an incident
to which is full dominion over the resources of the soil under that water
area, including oil.""6 The decision was met with hostility.2 7
,6 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
17 Id.
* 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855).
" Id. at 74.
2" 139 U.S. 240 (1891).
Id. at 264. The Court stated:
The extent of the territorial jurisdiction of Massachusetts over the sea adjacent to
its coast is that of an independent nation; and, except so far as any right of control
over this territory has been granted to the United States, this control remains with
the State .... Within what are generally recognized as the territorial limits of
States by the law of nations, a State can define its boundaries on the sea ....
Id.
, Seaward, supra note 14, at 74.
23 Tidelands, supra note 15, at 445 citing Ireland, Marginal Seas Around the States, 2 LA.
L. REV. 252 (1940). See also United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 180 (dissenting opin-
ion).
" United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), had issued numerous mineral leases in
coastal waters, and the United States reacted by bringing suit for an injunction and declara-
tion of rights. Id.
25 Id.
"' Id. at 38-39.
" One writer suggested the following:
Objection to the United States' claim was made because it was argued this was a
Federal intrusion on states' rights. 99 Cong. Rec. 2487-2538 (1953). Probably more
important, however, was the loss of revenue anticipated by the coastal states since
the value of the oil under the submerged lands was estimated at between $20 billion
and $250 billion. Id. at 2509, 2521 (1953).
2 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 374 n.4 (1969) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.U.J.].
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In response to the California decision, Congress passed the SLA 2 with
the clear intention of reinstating the state title abrogated by the Court's
ruling. 2The SLA, in effect, quitclaimed to the states all federal rights in
the marginal sea up to 3 miles from the "coastline," 30 defining "coastline"
partially as "the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters.":" An
early draft of the SLA had described "inland waters" as including "all
estuaries, ports, harbors, bays, channels, straits, historic bays, and sounds,
and all other bodies which join the open sea."3" The act as passed, however,
contained no definition of the term. This omission left open to speculation
the exact location of the 3-mile border which the states could claim.
The coastline of California was the first to undergo scrutiny. The
California Court had appointed a special master to define more clearly the
apportionment of ownership under its 1947 ruling3 and his report had been
filed in 1952.11 In 1964 the case was reopened for evaluation of the report
in light of the SLA and for final determination of rights.3 5 Discussion cen-
tered on two problem areas of the SLA: (1) the limitation of state claims
to 3 miles and (2) the definition of "inland waters." The Court noted that
the 3-mile limitation was inconsistent with the philosophy behind the
SLA, which had been to restore to the states all the waters within their
historic boundaries, 3 but concluded that "to the extent the limitation
would come into play, the philosophy was modified. '37 Next the Court
declared that in removing the definition of "inland waters" from the SLA,
Congress had plainly shown "its intent to leave the meaning of the term
43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1970).
See generally 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1385. After making an unfavorable
assessment of the California decision, the Committee on the Judiciary (H.R. REP. No. 1778,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1953)) wrote that: "We are certain that until the Congress enacts a law
consonant with what the States and the Supreme Court believed for more than a century was
the law, confusion and uncertainty will continue to exist, titles will remain clouded, and years
of vexation and complicated legislation will result." 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
1423.
" Tidelands, supra note 15, at 446.
31 43 U.S.C. § 1301(c) (1970); see note 6 supra.
31 S. REP. No. 133, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1953).
" The order calling for the appointment of a special master appears in United States v.
California, 334 U.S. 855 (1948). William H. Davis, Esquire, of New York City was appointed
to this position by order of February 12, 1949. United States v. California, 337 U.S. 952 (1949).
' The report was filed with the Court on November 10, 1952. United States v. California,
344 U.S. 872 (1952).
' United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965). The United States asserted that certain
bays were not included in the congressional grant because of their geographical position.
California maintained that the bays constituted "historic bays," were within the state's
historic boundaries, and thus came within the meaning of the SLA. Id. at 149.
For an explanation of the procedural development of the case see id. at 142-50 and Meiners,
Submerged Lands-Submerged Lands Act of 1953-Definition of "Inland Waters," 6
NATURAL RESOURCES J. 186, 186-88 (1966).
" 381 U.S. at 153-54.
, 381 U.S. at 154.
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to be elaborated by the courts, independently of the Submerged Lands
Act."3  Though the first California decision was its only reference for deal-
ing with the term in this context, 39 the Court found that it "clearly indi-
cated that 'inland waters' was to have an international content.", The
Court revealed that since the time of the first ruling, a settled international
definition had been announced in the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone (hereinafter referred to as the Convention)." It
then adopted the provisions of the Convention for the purposes of the SLA,
establishing "a single coastline for both the administration of the Sub-
merged Lands Act and the conduct of our future international relations."4"
Turning to the Convention's provisions, the majority noted 3 that article
7, paragraph 4 sets a 24-mile maximum width for the mouth of a body of
water if the body is to classify as a bay and thereby be deemed inland
water.44 However, article 7, paragraph 6, excepts "historic bays" from this
and other requirements . 5 Since the Convention does not define "historic
bays," the Court looked to other international sources and ruled that
I' d. at 151 (emphasis added).
3, The Court admitted that it had never precisely defined "inland waters" in the context
of bodies of water adjoining the open sea, id. at 161-62, stating:
It immediately appears that the bulk of cases cited by Congressmen during debates
on the Submerged Lands Act for the proposition that inland waters have been
defined time and time again by the courts deal with interior waters such as lakes
and rivers, and provide no assistance in classifying bodies of water which join the
open sea. In this latter context no prior case in this Court has ever precisely defined
the term.
Id.
"o Id. at 162.
" Note 7 supra. The Court declared that the position of the.United States in the contro-
versy at hand was expressed in the Convention. 381 U.S. at 163-64.
42 381 U.S. at 165. This is an unusual declaration for the judiciary to make. Apparently
the Court chose to ignore the possibility that the choice by the United States of an interna-
tional boundary might well be considered an entirely different matter than apportionment
of title between the Federal and state governments within that boundary. In fact, the very
same year that the SLA was passed, Congress extended the rights of the United States in
the ocean bed well beyond the 3-mile limit in the Outer Continental Shelf Land Act, 43
U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1970). See Tidelands, supra note 15, at 450-51.
Both the United States and California objected to the use of the Convention's definitions.
The United States contended that only such meaning as the Court would have given to the
SLA as of its enactment date (i.e., prior to the Convention) could be used. 381 U.S. at 164.
Certainly this is the only definition that might conceivably have been anticipated by the
legislators and have come within the legislative intent.
, 381 U.S. at 169.
Article 7, paragraph 4 of the Convention, supra note 7, reads:
If the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points of a
bay does not exceed twenty-four miles, a closing line may be drawn between these
two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as inter-
nal waters.
'5 Article 7, paragraph 6 of the Convention, supra note 7, reads: "The foregoing provisions
shall not apply to so-called 'historic bays' . . . ." The exception is also made "in any case
where the straight baseline system provided for in section 4 is applied." Id.
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"[elssentially these are bays over which a coastal nation has traditionally
asserted and maintained dominion with the acquiescence of foreign na-
tions." 6 The Court agreed with the special master that California had not
traditionally exercised the required dominion over any of the claimed wa-
ters.'7
Justice Black wrote a vigorous dissent in which he investigated the legis-
lative history of the SLA in the two problem areas discussed by the major-
ity and reached different conclusions as to congressional intent.'" He relied
on the same passages of committee reports which the majority found con-
trolling, but reported evidence of a much more consistent philosophy be-
hind the legislation, geared to restoring to the states the full extent of their
historic boundaries. 9 He found that the definition of inland waters was
deleted merely in response to warnings that a purely legislative definition
might create embarrassment for the State Department in its foreign rela-
tions and that an overly descriptive definition might be read as restrictive,
resulting in litigation. 0 The 3-mile maximum placed on the belt to be
1 381 U.S. at 172, citing Juridical Rqgime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1, 13 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/143 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Rgime].The
Court summarily decided that, of the bays under consideration which did not qualify under
section 4, none were saved by the exception in section 6, relying solely on the special master's
conclusions. California contended that "two studies of the criteria for determining historic
waters have been made since the Special Master filed his report which show that he applied
the wrong standards, thus vitiating his conclusion." 381 U.S. at 173. The Court dismissed
this argument, finding no substantial indication of this in his report.
381 U.S. at 173.
' Id. at 178-213. Justice Black found it ironic that an act passed expressly to escape the
Court's opinion should be construed so as to leave the Court free to determine claims without
any reference to the SLA's stated purpose. He disagreed with the Court's adoption of a
"formula of its own devising based on one used by the State Department in its handling of
foreign affairs." Id. at 210. He further criticized the Court for relying solely on the 13-year-
old report of the special master, which could not have anticipated either the SLA or the
Court's interpretation of its standards. Justice Black believed strongly that a special master
should be appointed to consider the facts in light of the new ruling and that California should
be given a chance to prove its historic boundaries. He emphasized that:
Both state and federal court decisions have held as a matter of fact and law that
some of the very bays in question here, which the Government argues are not inland
waters in the international sense, were within the boundaries of the State and
subject to its jurisdiction.
Id. at 212. In one case, People v. Stralla, 14 Cal.2d 617, 96 P.2d 941 (1939), he pointed out, a
United States Attorney General appeared amicus curiae in support of state jurisdiction. 381
U.S. at 212.
' d. at 185-88.
Justice Black pointed out that the deletion of the definition clause was an action taken
in response to the Attorney General's warning that an attempt to describe bays or otherwise
define "coast line" in a few words would almost surely result in litigation. Id. at 190 & n.28.
Justice Black quoted Senator Daniel of Texas as saying: "[Tlhe striking of these words was
not done in any manner to prejudice the rights of the States . . . .I just want to state that
for the record. ... Id. at 191. Black noted that Senator Gordon, whose remarks were relied
upon heavily by the majority in its contrary holding, concurred with the Senator Daniel. Id.
Black then concluded that the elimination of the legislative definition did not alter the
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claimed by the states was intended, he reported, to leave "totally undi
turbed the validity of their historic claims to the boundaries from which
those belts would be measured." 5'
Further, he stated that "[i]f there is anything clear in the legislative
history, it is that Congress was not satisfied with the way in which this
Court had decided the California case and did not approve of the consider-
ations of external sovereignty used there in determining a domestic dispute
over title."5 For the most part, however, his observations went unheeded.
The California Court had left unresolved the contention of the United
States that no state could maintain a claim to historic waters unless the
claim was endorsed by the United States. It ruled only that, in the case
before it, "with its questionable evidence of continuous and exclusive as-
sertions of dominion over the disputed waters,""3 the disclaimer by the
United States that any of the disputed areas were historic waters was
decisive. The question arose again when in 1969 another case which had
been decided before the SLA's passage, United States v. Louisiana,5 was
reopened for consideration in light of the new law. The Court wrestled with
the practical effects of applying the California ruling in the Gulf of Mex-
ico" but upheld its adoption of the Convention's standards.5 6 The majority
deferred to the judgment of a special master for the job of ruling on historic
claims 57 but did disagree with the assertion by the United States that "it
can prevent judicial recognition of a ripened claim to historic title merely
by lodging a disclaimer with the court."5 The Court ruled that the dis-
claimer was not conclusive and added that "it would be inequitable in
adapting the principles of international law to the resolution of a domestic
controversy, to permit the National Government to distort those princi-
ples, in the name of its power over foreign relations and external affairs,
by denying any effect to past events."5
original intent of the bill in the slightest degree. Rather, the elimination left it to the states
to prove their "historic boundaries," according to "the position in which both they and the
Federal Government thought they were for more than a century and a half." Id. at 197.
", Id. at 201. The majority had said that the addition of the 3-mile limitation was funda-
mental and that it modified the philosophy of the entire SLA when it was called into play.
Justice Black pointed out that Senator Holland, author of the original bill and of the addition,
considered it to be "just a minor change of verbiage," and that, in essence, the provision was
merely meant to prevent expansion of state claims beyond the nation's asserted jurisdiction.
Id.
52 381 U.S. at 210.
11 Id. at 175.
s' 394 U.S. 11 (1969).
Id. at 17-35.
5 Id. at 34-35.
" Id. at 74-78.
' Id. at 76.
s' Id. at 77. Justice Black again wrote a dissent, objecting to the use of an international
standard in a domestic title dispute: "There appears to be one thing certain about the
problem, however, and that is that the dispute between Louisiana and the United States is
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The Louisiana case did elaborate on the prerequisites of a historic claim,
describing the factors to be considered as: "(1) the exercise of authority
over the area by the State claiming the historic right; (2) the continuity of
this exercise of authority; [and] (3) the attitude of foreign States. '6 .
Under general principles of international law, the Court reported, "the
navigable sea is divided into three zones, distinguished by the nature of
the control which the contiguous nation can exercise over them."' , Of the
three zones, the inland waters are the ones which are "subject to the
complete sovereignty of the nation, as much as if they were a part of its
land territory, and the coastal nation has the privilege even to exclude
foreign vessels [from these waters] altogether."" Reasonable regulation of
navigation, however, is permissible even in the territorial sea and "is not
alone a sufficient exercise of dominion to constitute a claim to historic
inland waters. ' '63 The question left open after Louisiana was exactly what
degree of authority must be exercised over a body of water to establish it
as historic inland water.
In the principle case, United States v. Alaska,4 the Supreme Court looks
to the guidelines developed in the California and Louisiana opinions to
determine "whether the body of water known as Cook Inlet is a historic
bay. 6 5 Alaska seeks to establish that this area, although it does not meet
any precise geographical test for inland water, has achieved that status by
virtue of the manner in which it has been treated traditionally by the
no part of international affairs subject to international law, but is exclusively a domestic
controversy between the State and Nation." Id. at 81.
Id. at 23-24 n.27, citing Regime, supra note 46, at 13.
Id. at 22, citing L. BOUCHEZ, THE REGIME OF BAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (1945); 1 A.
SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 203-11 (1962); M. STROHL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF BAYS 3-4 (1963).
62 394 U.S. at 22.
I3 d. at 24.
422 U.S. 184 (1975).
" Id. at 185. Since the tract in question lies more than 3 geographical miles from the shore,
it lies outside the grant made to the states under the SLA, unless it can fall within the
Convention's definition of "inland water." Since it also lies seaward more than 3 miles from
a line across the inlet at Kalgin Island, where the headlands are about 24 miles apart, the
tract cannot be considered land underneath a bay. See Convention, supra note 7, art. 7, para.
4. The United States contends that Alaska owns only up to this 24-mile mouth under article
7, paragraph 4 of the Convention, as adopted for the purposes of the SLA. Alaska, however,
claims this tract under the "historic bay" exception of article 7, paragraph 6 of the Conven-
tion. Both parties concede that upper Cook Inlet, above Kalgin Island, belongs to Alaska
under the SLA. The Court outlines the consequences of its determination as follows:
If the inlet is a historic bay, the State of Alaska possesses sovereignty over the
land beneath the waters of the lower, or seaward, portion of the inlet. If the inlet is
not a historic bay, the United States as against the State, has paramount rights to
the subsurface lands in question.
422 U.S. at 186. One wonders what basis there is for the vesting of title in the United States
merely because the state claim fails. It seems that a determination that the United States




coastal sovereign. The Court investigates the inlet's treatment by the three
authorities which have claimed its shore-Russia, the United States (dur-
ing Alaska's territorial period), and Alaska."6
The district court had found that "Russia exercised sovereignty over the
disputed area of Cook Inlet.""7 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,
finds that none of the facts relied upon by the lower court demonstrate the
essential exercise of authority in that period prior to the United States'
acquisition in 1867." As the district court pointed out, however, this alone
would not defeat Alaska's claim. Under general principles of international
law, no precise length of time is necessary to create a usage upon which
historic title can be based. 9
Blackmun next discusses Alaska's territorial period, reviewing five
United States statutes which Alaska offers as evidence of control exercised
by the Federal Government prior to the grant of Statehood. 0 He points out,
" The Supreme Court finds this division in the district court's approach. 422 U.S. at 189-
90. While such a division is not apparent in the reported opinion, it was brought out in the
petition of certiorari. See id. at 190 n.9, citing Petition for Certiorari 21a-55a.
" 422 U.S. at 190. The Court takes this statement from the Petition for Certiorari 25a. The
reported opinion of the district court did not discuss the exercise of sovereignty prior to 1906.
See United States v. Alaska, 352 F. Supp. 815 (1972).
68 422 U.S. at 190. Justice Blackmun discusses three facts: (1) that there were Russian
settlements on the shores of Cook Inlet by the early 1800's; (2) that a Russian fur trader fired
on an English vessel which attempted to enter the inlet in 1786; and (3) that in 1821 Tsar
Alexander I issued an imperial ukase which purported to exclude all foreign vessels from the
waters within 100 miles of the coast of Alaska. The Court discounts these facts on the grounds
respectively that the settlements indicated merely a claim to land with no suggestion of
authority asserted over the inlet, that the fur trader's firing was an act of a private citizen
with no apparent governmental authorization, and that the ukase was unequivocally with-
drawn in the face of vigorous protests from the United States and England. Regarding the
fur trader's firing, the Court points out that the firing of a cannon is consistent with the
present position of the United States that the inland waters of Alaska are to be measured by
the 3-mile mark under the old Cannon Shot Rule. The Cannon Shot Rule is to the effect that
a coastal state possesses sovereignty over the waters within range of a cannon shot from its
shore, based on the traditional range of 18th century cannon. Id. at 191 and n.ll. With regard
to Tsar Alexander's edict, the Court does not discuss whether the ukase or the protest ex-
pressly referred to Cook Inlet. The assertion of a 100-mile claim alone, without any specifics
as to bays and inlets, would have certainly invoked protest in 1821, when the Cannon Shot
Rule was widely accepted.
" United States v. Alaska, 352 F. Supp. 815, 820 (1972), citing Rfgime, supra note 46, at
104. The requisite usage and title could have ripened since the United States' acquisition of
the territory in 1867.
By the Treaty of Cession in 1867 Russia ceded to the United States "all the territory
and dominion now possessed [by Russia] on the continent of America and in the
adjacent islands." 15 Stat. 539. The cession was effectively a quitclaim. It is undis-
puted that the United States thereby acquired whatever dominion Russia had
possessed immediately prior to cession.
422 U.S. at 192 n.13.
, 422 U.S. at 192-96. These statutes, first discussed by the trial court, are as follows:
a. Act of July 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 240, codified as Rev. Stat. § 1956 (1878), prohibit-
ing the killing of sea otter and other fur-bearing animals "within the limits of the
said territory [of Alaska], or in the waters thereof."
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first, that none of these promulgations were expressly linked to Cook Inlet
in a definitive way (except by administrative regulations), and second,
that they merely prove the fact of fish and wildlife management, and
jurisdiction to that end." The question is whether or not enforcement of
fishing regulations is legally sufficient to demonstrate the type of authority
necessary to establish historic title." Justice Blackmun points out that
"the exercise of authority necessary to establish historic title must be
commensurate in scope with the nature of the title claimed."" ' He reviews
the three internationally recognized zones of the sea discussed in Louisiana
and concludes that for classification as inland waters, "the exercise of
sovereignty must have been, historically, an assertion of power to exclude
all foreign vessels and navigation."" Justice Blackmun rules that enforce-
ment of fishing regulations, a characteristic of the marginal sea under the
international scheme, is patently insufficient.1
5
The Court finally looks to the evidence that Alaska has exercised sover-
eignty over Cook Inlet during her period of statehood. The two factors
which Justice Blackmun considers here are the district court's findings
that (1) Alaska has enforced fishing regulations in basically the same fash-
ion that the United States had during the territorial period, 6 and (2)
Alaska had arrested two Japanese fishing vessels more than 3 miles from
shore in the Shelikof Straits in 1962.11 He dismisses the Alaskan fishing
regulations as he did those of the United States. ' The seizure of a foreign
b. The Alien Fishing Act of 1906, 48 U.S.C. § 243 (1970), prohibiting commercial
fishing by non-citizens "in any of the waters of Alaska under the jurisdiction of the
United States."
c. Executive Order No. 3752, November 3, 1922, creating the Southwestern Alaska
Fisheries Reservation. Regulations promulgated pursuant to the order by Secretary
of Commerce Hoover referred to and embraced "all the shores and waters of Cook
Inlet."
d. The White Act of 1924, ch. 272, 43 Stat. 464 (codified in scattered sections of
48 U.S.C.), for protection of Alaskan fisheries, by such regulations as the Secretary
of Commerce might issue. The regulations consistently defined the Act to include
all the waters of Cook Inlet.
e. The Gharrett-Studder Line of 1957, a chart reflecting the boundaries of the
United States' fishing regulations for the purposes of an agreement with Canada
regarding fishing for salmon with nets. The maps were passed on to the State
Department by the Bureau of Fisheries with express disclaimers that the line was
not related to the territorial waters of the United States in a legal sense.
422 U.S. at 192-96.
1 422 U.S. at 196.
72 Id.
11 Id. at 197.
74 Id.
71 Id. The Court in Louisiana had similarly ruled that navigation regulations which allowed
the innocent passage of foreign vessels were inadequate to establish historic title. 394 U.S. at
24.
11 422 U.S. at 200-01.




vessel, however, is given a more careful examination.
The incident occurred when a private commercial fishing fleet in Japan
publicly announced its intention to send a fleet into the waters of Cook
Inlet and the Shelikof Straits." Alaskan officials informed the Federal
Government which, as the Court says, "significantly took no action." 0 Two
boats did enter Cook Inlet briefly"1 and then moved into the Shelikof Strait
where they were boarded by Alaskan officials and the crews arrested. The
Japanese fishing company entered into an agreement with the State of
Alaska whereby the ships and crews were returned in exchange for a prom-
ise to refrain from fishing in the straits or inlet pending adjudication.82
Japan formally protested to the United States Government, which dec-
lined to take a position.83 The proceedings were dismissed with no determi-
nation of jurisdiction."
The Court concedes that to the extent that the incident indicates an
intent on the part of Alaska to exclude all foreign vessels, it must be viewed
as an exercise of authority over the waters as inland waters.8 5 Justice
Blackmun, however, discounts its significance. First, he asserts that the
incident was an exercise of sovereignty only over the Shelikof Straits.86
Secondly, he is "not satisfied that the exercise of authority was sufficiently
unambiguous to serve as the basis of historic title to inland waters."87 He
cites Louisiana and California for the proposition that the claim, even
though between a state and the Federal Government, is to be measured
primarily as an international, rather than a purely domestic claim.U He
decides that from the Japanese Government's point of view, the import of
the incident is far from clear:
Alaska clearly claimed the waters in question as inland waters but the
United States neither supported nor disclaimed the State's position.
Given the ambiguity of the Federal Government's position, we cannot
agree that the assertion of sovereignty possessed the clarity essential to a
claim of historic title over inland waters.9
I' d.
Id. The district court had pointed out that on a prior occasion an official of the State
Department indicated to the Governor of Alaska the Federal Government's unwillingness to
act but encouraged action by the State of Alaska. 352 F. Supp. at 820.
' The Supreme Court reports that the boats were in lower Cook Inlet one day and left the
next, 422 U.S. at 201, whereas the district court had reported that the intrusion lasted only
a few hours, 352 F. Supp. at 820. This discrepancy is not explained by the Court.
422 U.S. at 202.
Id. The Federal Government declined to take a formal position on the issue pending








GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Finally, Blackmun points out that Japan immediately protested and never
acceded to the position taken by Alaska. Therefore, he concludes, no for-
eign acquiescence has occurred and no historic title has ripened."
If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the Submerged Lands
Act, it is that "Congress determined that state management, administra-
tion, development, leasing and use of natural resources on or above naviga-
ble waters was in the national interest."9 ' There is no indication in the
history of the SLA that the courts were to give it what amounts to a strict
construction in favor of the Federal Government. It is at least apparent
that Congress did not intend that the judiciary should promulgate defini-
tions and interpretations independently of the act" and its philosophy.
The purpose of the SLA was to put an end to the dispute over ownership
of submerged lands which had brought oil production in offshore lands to
a standstill.9 3 Congress had partial knowledge of the monetary value of the
resources which it chose to grant to the states but also knew that, constitu-
tionally, the Federal Government is to raise revenue by taxation and not
by ownership of profit-producing land.9 1 The states have traditionally been
the land-owning units.9
Opponents of the SLA have attacked it on the grounds that the Federal
Government alone must supervise any undertaking which may have a
bearing on foreign affairs. The grant has been upheld, however, against
claims that it involved an unconstitutional relinquishment of sovereignty.97
The SLA's conveyance was not absolute, but was qualified by the control
the Federal Government continued to exercise for regulation of navigation
and other purposes of international importance.99 Nor was the grant inclu-
sive of all lands claimed by the United States or one which illegally ex-
tended state boundaries. In Presidential Proclamation No. 2667,11 the
,o Id. Justice Blackmun points out that the Court has taken no position in the debate over
whether mere absence of opposition is sufficient evidence of foreign acquiescence. Id. at 189,
citing United States v. Louisiana 394 U.S. 11, 23-24 n.27. The district court had found that
most commentators require only "general toleration by the community of nations" and that
testimony "clearly indicated the general absence of foreign fishing vessels [in the inlet] over
the years." 352 F. Supp. at 821. Justice Blackmun, however, "feel[s] that something more
than mere failure to object must be shown." 422 U.S. at 200.
" Smith & Marshall, Mariculture: A New Ocean Use 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 307, 321
(1974), citing 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1970).
92 See note 38 supra and accompanying text; see, e.g., N.Y.U.J., supra note 27, at 383.
'3 N.Y.U.J., supra note 27, at 383.
" Note, The Federal - State Offshore Oil Dispute, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 755, 763 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Oil Dispute].
" Id. at 765.
" Id. at 761.
'7 Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954). The argument against constitutionality was that
"the United States can no more relinquish its sovereignty to the submerged lands than it can
yield the sovereignty it possesses over the Federal Union as a whole." Oil Dispute, supra note
91 at 760.
' Tidelands, supra note 15, at 451.
S. REP. No. 411, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1945); see 5 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 580, 583
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United States laid claim to all resources in the continental shelf. The Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act' 0 reiterated and acknowledged this claim.
There is precedent, too, for state boundaries more than 3 miles out, even
though such extensions would normally be contrary to national claims,"'
because Texas and Florida" 2 were admitted to the Union with congression-
ally approved boundaries of 3 leagues.
The problem, then, lies not with the SLA itself but with the Court's
interpretations. The use of the Convention's standards for administration
of the SLA has been, at best, unsatisfactory. The majority in California
had justified its adoption partially in terms of establishing the most worka-
ble standard possible,'0 3 but the Louisiana case quickly showed how cum-
bersome its provisions can be in some situations.' 4 The present case has
demonstrated another significant inadequacy: while the Convention does
provide guidelines for resolution of many questions which may come before
the Court, there is no "settled international rule" for determining historic
bays. 105
Furthermore, as Justice Black pointed out in his earlier dissents,'10 it
seems inappropriate to apply an international standard to settle a purely
domestic problem. The controversy concerns how much of the area claimed
by the United States will be administered by the states and how much by
the Federal Government and has no real bearing on one of the most press-
ing international concerns, the obstruction of waters above the seabed.""
Use of an international yardstick leaves the Court in the embarrassing
position of having to rule, as it did in Alaska, that, though the United
States has not exercised sovereignty over a particular body of water, it has
exclusive rights to the resources of the seabed below.'00 The disclaimer by
the United States of any dominion over Cook Inlet took on an interesting
role: while the Court would not rule that it was conclusive as to title, '1 9 the
disclaimer went a long way toward deteriorating Alaska's claim and yet did
not prevent final adjudication that "the United States, as against the
n.20 (1975).
43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
,0 N.Y.U.J., supra note 27, at 384.
102 United States v. Louisiana, 364 U.S. 502 (1960).
381 U.S. at 165.
04 See 394 U.S. at 83-84 (Black, J., dissenting).
oS See generally L. BOUCHEZ, THE REGIME OF BAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964).
' See, e.g., United States v. Louisiana 394 U.S. 11, 81 (1964).
107 Id.
' The Court had framed its basis for resolution as follows:
If the inlet is a historic bay, the State of Alaska possesses sovereignty over the
land beneath waters of the lower, or seaward, portion of the inlet. If the inlet is not
a historic bay, the United States, as against the State, has paramount rights to the
subsurface lands in question.
422 U.S. at 186.
,o' Id. at 203-204 n.17.
1976]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
State, has paramount rights to the subsurface lands in question."'
Justice Black, dissenting in United States v. Louisiana, suggested that
"since we cannot look to legalistic tests of title, we must look to the claims,
understandings, expectations and uses of the States throughout their his-
tory.""' An equitable basis for decision, rather than reference to an inter-
national standard, has been considered by commentators." 2 One possible
solution would be to give ownership of the seabed to one level of govern-
ment and then split the revenue between the two levels."' Since none of
the noncoastal states have formally objected to the bonus of revenue for
coastal states under the existing system,"' such a division should be agree-
able to most and would eventually result in a portion of the proceeds being
passed to inland states through the federal government. This arrangement
is already being used under the Mineral Leasing Act, with 37.5 percent of
revenue earned going to the states."15
The decision in the present case stands as a reaffirmation of the Court's
apparent conviction that the Convention's standards are to govern the
administration of the SLA. Much of the task of actually delineating
boundaries will undoubtedly be left to administrative agencies, or in the
event of dispute, to court-appointed special masters. The Court, however,
has left itself in a position such that it may "find it necessary at times to
indulge in the delicate task of assessing whether some issues, not covered
by the Convention, necessitate executive exclusivity, and if not, the rea-
sonableness and fairness of the executive's decision.""' 6
Sarah Melissa Stebbins
Id. at 186; see note 104 supra.
United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 90 (1960).
12 See Oil Dispute, supra note 91.
"i Id. at 769.
" Id. at 765.
,' 30 U.S.C. § 191 (1970).
Ereli, The Submerged Lands Act and the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone, 41 TUL. L. REV. 555, 578 (1967).
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